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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN F. RUSSELL,

\

I

Respondent, {

Case No. 9648

vs.
GRANT L. VALENTINE,

Appellant and Petitioner.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Grant L. Valentine, appellant in the above-entitled
matter, and petitioner herein, in accordance with Rule
76( e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby petitions
this Court to reconsider its initial opinion in the aboveentitled matter filed on the 3rd day of December, 1962,
with relation to the issues hereinafter set forth, and
based on this Petition to rehear and determine such
issues; .as grounds for this Petition, petitioner respectfully urges that the Court, in its opinion, erred in its
determination of both fact and law in the following particulars:
1. In the determination of faet that Section 8 of the
leasehold instrument (renewal clause) was ambiguous so
1
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as to permit the introduction and admission of parol
evidence;
2. In the determination of law that parol evidence,
may be received to vary and alter the terms of a written
instrument and to create rather than cure an ambiguity
with respect thereto.
WHEREFORE, your petitioner respectfully prays
that this Court consider this petition and the brief annexed in support hereof, that the Court issue an order
to rehear and determine the issues raised, and that upon
rehearing, the Court enter its judgment reversing the
decision of the lower Court.
HANSON & BALDWIN &
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
Attorneys for Appellant and
Petitioner
515 Kearns Building
8alt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE SUPR.bME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN F. RUSSELL,

Respondent,
Case No. 9648

vs.
GRANT L. VALENTINE,

Appellant and Petitioner.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATE11EN·T OF FACTS
A full embodiment of the f.ac.ts of this matter are not
required as they relate to the Petition for Rehearing, the
san1e having been set forth in the Brief of Appellant
heretofore filed with the Court (see App. Brief, p. 2, 3).

It is adequate to say that plaintiff, in May, 19'50,
conveyed a leasehold estate in eertain real property
located in Weber County to Self-Service Enterprises,
Inc., the Petitioner acquiring such leasehold interest
through a series of assignments stemming from SelfService. The writing under which the conveyance was
made (Clause 8 thereof) provided that the lessee, or its
assigns, held a right to renew the lease provided that the
3
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latter met and satisfied specified conditions precedent
(Exhibit 1). The petitioner fully performed such conditions (Exhibit 8).
It was asserted by respondent in the lower court and
upon appeal that Clause 8 was ambiguous and unenforceable; particularly, it was claimed that the term or
period of renewal could not he reasonably ascertained
from the writing,' necessitating the use of extrinsic testimony. The clause under attack states that:
"8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and
perform all of the terms and conditions of this
lease, on his part to be kept and performed, said
Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease
for a further period beginning as of the termination date of this lease, provided he shall notify
the Lessor in writing thirty days prior to the
terms of this agreement that he desires such renewal and provided further, that he shall sign or
offer to sign a new lease upon the same terms
and conditions as are herein contained."
The District Court found the entire clause to be unenforceable and void for ambiguity and that any renewal
the,reof, required further negotiation and execution, by
conveyance, of a new estate (R. 22, 23). This ·Court, by
its initial opinion, affirmed the Findings and Judgment
of the lower court. It is to that opinion that this brief is
directed.

4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DETERMINATION THAT CLAUSE 8 OF THE
LEASE IS AM,BIGUOUS AND UNENFORCEABLE IS ERRONEOUS.
a. The Plain Meaning of Such Clause is to and can be
Gauged bu the Terms of the Conveuance.
POINT II.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT PERMITS PAROL
TESTIMONY TO CREATE RATHER THAN EXPLAIN THE
ALLEGED AMBIGUITY IN THE LEASEHOLD INSTRUMENT.
a. The Effect of the Decision is to Void Rather Than
Interpret the Writing.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DETERMINATION THAT CLAUSE 8 OF THE
LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS AND UNENFORCEABLE IS ERRONEOUS.
a. The Plain Meaning of Such Clause is to and can be
Gauged bu the Terms of the Conveyance.

The leasehold instrument unde consideration contains nine (9') par.agraphs, each devoted to a separate
purpose, each performing a separate function as a part
of the integrated lease. The purpose and function of
Clause 8 could not he more pronounced, that is, the lessee
upon performance of the conditions of the lease and upon
proper notice, was granted an option to renew upon the
terms and conditions of the initial conveyance. The
Clause susceptible to no other construction; the Opinion
of the Court finds otherwise, however.

is

5
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Why, it should be queried, is it to be presu1ned that
the lessor was engaged in a penmanship exercise in giving the lessee the right to renew; that Russell didn't
intend to grant that for which the writing calls~ The
quick answer to this is that there is no presumption to
that effect - that, in law, an individual is presumed to
have given meaning to a writing rather than that which
is meaningless. One need only turn to the writings of
Wigmore for support of this rule of construction:
"When a jural act is embodied in a single
memorial, all other utterances of the parties on
that topic are legally immaterial for the purpose
of determining what are the terms of their act."
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. 2425.
The judicial policy underlying the presumption that
a written declaration by a party is to be given effect is
well put by Henroid, J., in Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice,
7 U.2d 276, 323 P. 2d 259 (1958), wherein it was announced:

''* * * but it is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their fair and understandable
language deliberately committed to writing and
endorsed by them as signators thereto. * * * It
is not unreasonable to hold one responsible for
language which he hi1nself expouses. Such language is the ·only implement he gives us to fashion
a determination as to the intentions of the parties."
There is little risk attached in saying that this axiom
of construction is the life· blood of the pa.rol evidence
rule.
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is said by the Court in paragraph 4 of its opinion
that Clause 8 of the subject Lease is so ambiguous and
tmcertain that extraneous evidence should be received to
determine the "intention of the parties" (a st.atement
made in light of the fact that Clause 8 is a grant by the
Lessor, Russell, to the Lessee and if spoken orally, cotdd
emin.ate only from the mouth of the Lessor). The Opinion, in paragraph 2 thereof, sets forth Clause 8 in full
and emphasis is given to the following phrase:

''* * * said Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease for a furthe;;· period * * *"
Petitioner is in accord with the Court that this
phrase, indeed, is the keynote to a proper understanding
and interpretation of the Clause. It, by chronology, may
be digested word by word for its formal meaning and
such has been accomplished by Petitioner in his Brief on
Appeal (see App. Brief, pp. 8-11). At the outside and in
its most strained atmosphere, the phrase grants to the
lessee a privilege, a power (which he would not otherwise
have), a right to lawfully possess the leasehold estate for
a time exceeding the original term; there is but a single,
unitary period set forth in the writing which requires a
ten (10) year "term", and that provision is found in the
granting clause on page 1 of Exhibit A:

"* * * for the term of ten years".
Ordinary parlance gives "period" .and ''term" a congeneric meaning. Martinez v. Rocky Mounta.im & 8. F.
Ry. Co., 47 P.2d 903 (N.M. 1935). Applying the canon
of the "last antecedent", Dttnn v. Bryan, 77 Utah 604,299
7
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P.ac. 253 (1931), in ascertaining the de1neanor of the word
"period" at the end of the phrase emphasized by the
Court, it is implicit that reference is made to the original
··ten year term''.
But the opinion of the Court, in paragraph 4, does
not arrest its treatment of the emphasized phrase with
a discussion of the integrated sentence; rather, it takes
out of context four words "for a further period" which,
it is said, is the focal point:
"The crux of the matter is the phrase 'for a
further period'".
This prepositional phrase is then said to convey an infinite number of meanings, for example, ''one day, one
week, one month, one year, and so on". Petitioner concurs that these four words, standing alone, aided by no
other portion of Clause 8, and aided by no rules of con-.
struction, would have a host of varied responses. But is
this a proper test at all?
Petitioner submits that it is not; that an adherence
to this norm of construction would render every provision, condition or statement of every writing ambiguous,
uncertain and unenforceable. This approach might have
been in vogue in the day of the Sophists but not at the
common law; it ignores the canon that a writing is interpreted as a whole (see Restatement of Contracts 235 (c)),
the rule o~ pari· materia, and the doctrine of the last antecedent. Dunn v. Bryan, supra. It overlooks the decisions
of this Court in Ephriam Theatre Co1npany v. Hawk, 7
tJ.2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221, and Wilson v. Gardner, 10 U.2d
8
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89, 348 P. 2d 931 (1960); in the latter case it was declared:
"In considering a written instrument it is. a
judicial function to interpret a written contract
which is free from ambiguity and does not require
oral testilnony to deterrnine its meaning. Ambigtt.ity in .ct written instrument does not ~wppear
until the application of pertinent rules of interpret.at~on to the face of the instrument leaves it
generally uncertain which one of two or more
n1e.anings is the proper meaning.'' (Emphasis
ours).
Admittedly, Clause 8 is not a shining spectacle of
draftsmanship at its best; it could be more certain in its
definition or explanation of:
"the right to renew this lease for a further
period".

It could have specified the year, month, and day that the
right of renewal ran. The fact that it did not so specify
does not render it so ambiguous, when considered with
the other portions and clauses of the lease, as to permit
a traverse outside of the written instrument. ·The last
phrase in Clause 8, itself, resolves any doubt that the
lessor granted lessee a right to renew unde·r the same
"terms and conditions'' as the primary writing:
''provided * * * he shall sign or offer to sign
a new lease upon the same terms and conditions
as are herein contained."
It would be a parody of the worst kind to say that the
clause above quoted did not refer to all other elements of
the lease, including the original term of ten years. Clause
8 needs no crutch from parol evidence to portray its
intent.
9
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POINT II.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT PERMITS PAROL
TESTIMONY TO CREATE RATHER THAN EXPLAIN THE
ALLEGED AMBIGUITY IN THE LEASEHOLD INSTRUMENT.
a. The Effect of the Decisi·on is to Void Rather Than
Interpret the Writing.

Once parol evidence was determined to be necessary
in order to clarfy the alleged ambiguity arising out of
Clause 8, its only legitimate function, when admitted,
was to explain and illucidate the nature of Petitioner's
right of renewal. Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 105
Utah 272, 143 P.2d 281 (1943). For if .all else be uncertain, there is no question but that Clause 8 was a "renewal" clause and that the lessee was granted the "right
to renew'' by Russell. The findings of the trial court,
approved in this Court's initial Opinion, do n'luch 1nore
than penetrate Clause 8 to give certainty to the uncertain. The findings eradicate the clause from the lease
entirely; in effect, it denies petitioner any right to
renew whatsoever, and places him in a position as
though the writing never contained any renewal language.
Finding No. 8 of the lower court provides in part:
"8. The Court further finds that the provisions * * * of the Lease referring to renewal
* * * are .ambiguous and incapable of enforcement, and that any extension, or renewal * * *
would require negot.iations and execution of a
new lease * * *". (En1phasis added)
The finding, in itself, is contradictory for it acknowledges the existence of .a "right to renew" and yet re10
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quires negotiation of all elen1ents. Such result compounds
any ambiguity formerly existing instead of clarifying it
and reserves to the lessee nothing that he would not have
possessed had there been no lease at all. It gives license
to be done that which the Supreme Court of Washington
has said can not be done :
"Parol evidence is never admissible to create
an ambiguity, but only to explatn or remove an
ambiguity apparent on the face of the instrument,
or to identify a subject matter otherwise uncertain." Van Doren Roofing & Cornice Co. v. Guard~an Cas. & Gu,aranty Co., 99 Wash 68, 168 P. 1124.

It ·w:as the theme of Russell, in the trial court, not only to
contradict the terms of Clause 8 of the lease by parol
testimony, but also to show such language to be confusing. The use of oral testimony in the case at bar serves
as an ,acid test for the soundness of the parol evidence
rule, for after its admission, the written instrument was
still the best evidence of the lessor's intent in granting
the ''right to renew". In Washington F?Jsh & Oyster Co.
v. Halferty & Co., 269 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1954), after determining that patrol testimony, received to clarify an
ambiguity in a contract, was confusing and in conflict,
the vVashington Court stated:

"* * * this case is an illustration of the soundness of the rule (parol evidence rule) - that the
writing still remains the best evidence of the
understanding of the parties and of the terms by
which they intended to hind themselves. The parol
evidence of the parties admitted by the court was
either conflicting or confusing as to the intent of
the parties. ,. * *"
11
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It is submitted that it was erroneous to allow parol
evidence to cause the ambiguity and predicated thereon,
to deny Petitioner a "right'' which Clause 8 quite clearly
.afforded him.
CONCLUSION
That the Court, based on the Petition and Brief of
Grant L. Valentine, order a rehearing in the case at bar;
that upon reeonsideration, the Court reverse the judgment of the trial Court as to the issues raised by this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN &
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
Attorneys for Appellant and
Petitioner
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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